Dziejowa względność wartości moralnych a relatywizm historyczny
Historical Relativity of Moral Values and Historical Relativism

Summary/Abstract: The aim of this paper is a critical reflection on historical-axiological relativism. Accordingto the thesis of the work, the (possible) relativity of moral values does not entail relativism. Inother words: one can affirm the relativity (in some aspects) of moral values or morality itself,while rejecting the relativistic view of moral values. The paper applies analytical methods. Firstof all, the previously mentioned methods serve to highlight the constitutive properties of moralvalues (in particular other-planning), and later to reconstruct the structure of relativistic con-cepts. The collected information is used for criticism, which proceeds in two ways: it criticizesthe relativistic content of historical relativism and criticizes the thesis that history has the powerto make values relative. At the end of the paper, an original argument was formulated, accordingto which history itself cannot make moral values relative, which makes historical relativisma non-independent position.

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